A Different Response to those Dreaded Words

No one ever wants to hear his or her partner of many years announce that "I just do not love you anymore." Typically, the response will be tears, anger, threats of lawsuits. In a very interesting article, published on July 31, 2009, in the New York Times, see how author Laura A. Munson chose to respond. Click here to read Munson's article.

Alienation of Affections & Criminal Conversation Claims Lose Some Ground

House Bill 1110, entitled "An Act To Clarify Procedures In Civil Actions For Alienation Of Affections and Criminal Conversation" was signed into law on August 3, 2009. The effective date of the law is October 1, 2009 and it will apply to actions arising from acts occurring on or after that date. The act is codified at N.C. General Statues sect. 52-13 (a), (b), and (c).

The act make one distinct change to the current laws controlling actions for Alienation of Affections ("AA") and Criminal Conversation ("CC"). Under the new law, after spouses physically separate from one another with the intent of of at least one of them to live permanently separate and apart, a third person who then becomes romantically and/or sexually involved with one of the separated spouses cannot be sued by the other spouse for AA or CC. Currently, a third party risks exposure for claims of AA and or CC if he/she involves him/her self with a married but separated person.

The new law specifies that a person may sue only another natural person, as opposed to a corporation or other entity, for AA or CC.

Finally, the statute of limitations for these civil actions is three years for the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.

The Pitfalls of Self-representation

A recent North Carolina Court of Appeals opinion, Gary Michael Sluder v. Christina B. Sluder, illustrates the pitfalls for the unwary that exist for spouses who attempt to represent themselves. Here, the self-represented Defendant, Christina Sluder had her poorly plead claims for equitable distribution and alimony dismissed by the trial court. After a trial on her breach of contract claim, Christina won, but her victory was short lived as it was reversed by the Appellate Court.

Specifics of the Case

Gary and Christina Sluder were married to each other in 1999 and they separated on June 19, 1999. After they were separated and before they were divorced, Gary hand wrote and signed a document dated January 10, 2005 that stated: "I Gary M. Sluder pay to my wife Christina, the sum of on One Thousand Dollars a month in post spousal support." (emphasis added). The courts concluded that what Gary actually meant was post separation support.

Later in 2005, Gary filed for Divorce and the Divorce Judgment was entered on December 30, 2009. Apparently, Gary did not pay Christina the $1,000.00 per months addressed in the January 10, 2005 document, because prior to the entry of the Divorce Judgment, Christina filed pro se pleadings seeking post separation support based on contract from Gary. Christina also attempted, but failed, to properly plead claims for equitable distribution and alimony. Those claims were dismissed by the trial court.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the uncertified agreement between the parties:

Finding of Fact 7: In early January 2005, the Plaintiff [Gary] agreed to give the Defendant one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per month so that the Defendant could have evidence of income she would need to rent an apartment for herself and her minor children

Conclusion of Law 1: Pursuant to G.S. 52-10 the Plaintiff owes the Defendant the sum of one thousand dollars (1,000 [sic] per month for a reasonable time after promising the Defendant he would do so.

Conclusion of Law 2: That a reasonable period of time for the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per month would be eleven (11) months.

The trial court then entered judgment in favor of Christina, awarding her recovery from Gary in the amount of $11,000.00. Gary appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals

Types of Marital Contracts

As between themselves, married people can make two distinct types of contracts: (1) separation agreements, and (2) property settlements.



A separation agreement is a contract between spouses providing for marital
support rights and executed while the parties are separated or planning to
separate immediately.


A property settlement provides for the division of property held by the
spouses. Spouses may enter into a property settlement at any time, regardless of
whether they contemplate separation or divorce.



The North Carolina Supreme Court has often noted the differing purposes
underlying the two contracts. The "heart of a separation agreement is the
parties’ intention to live separate and apart forever..." In re Adamee,
291 N.C. 386, 391 (1976). However, a property settlement "contains provisions
... which might with equal propriety have been made had no separation been
contemplated." Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 261 (1955).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10.1 governs the execution of separation agreements. Pursuant to the statute, to be valid and enforceable a separation agreement must satisfy all of the following requirements:

•The agreement must be in writing
•The terms of the agreement must be consistent with public policy
•The agreement must be acknowledged by both of the spouses in the presence of a certifying officer as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10 (b).
•The certifying officer must not be a party to the contract

A certifying officer is a "... notary public, or a justice, judge, magistrate, clerk, assistant clerk, or deputy clerk of the General Court of Justice, or the equivalent or corresponding officers of the state, territory or foreign country where the acknowledgment is made." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10 (b)


The execution of property settlements is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10 (a).

The Appeal

On appeal, Gary argued that the trail court erred by concluding the January 10, 2005 document was an enforceable agreement governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10. Instead, Gary contended that the agreement concerned support rights made during separation and as such that it was governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10.1. Further, because the agreement was not acknowledged by both of the parties before a certifying officer as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10.1, Gary argued that the agreement was not enforceable. The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with Gary and reversed the trial court’s award of recovery to Christina because the agreement was invalid under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10.1.